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Introduction
When Deng Xiaoping initiated a series of eco-nomic and social reforms in 1978, rural societyreorganisation constituted a critical first step. To
quote Barry Naughton, (2) “It was in the countryside that re-
forms succeeded first, and it was the dramatic success of
rural reforms that cleared the way for continuing and pro-
gressively more profound change.” 
The very core of this founding reform was institutional. A
significant number of rights were transferred from collective
structures to farm households, and this engaged a dynamics
of extension of individual rights that is still far from being
over today.
Over this period, the importance of rural reforms cannot be
overstated. In 1978, more than 82 percent of the population,
almost 800 million people, was rural, while agriculture em-
ployed 70.5 percent of Chinese workforce. Thirty years
later, more than 55 percent of the population, close to 730
million people, was considered rural, while agriculture still
represented 40.8 percent of employment. (3) Land was and
remains a major element of most of Chinese people’s daily
lives and a decisive determinant of Chinese economic per-
formance. This importance is well acknowledged by the cen-
tral authorities: in January 2010, for the seventh consecutive
year, Document No. 1, jointly issued by the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China (CCPCC) and the
State Council of the National’s People Congress
(SCNPC), was dedicated to rural issues and land rights
problems.
This article aims at recalling the main steps in the evolution
of institutional arrangements over rural land, and at identify-
ing their main consequences, successes, and shortcomings.
Its main objective is to summarise and discuss two dimen-
sions of research on land rights issues in rural China that
have not been synthesised by previous literature reviews: it
will provide an extended inventory of the laws and regula-
tions on rural land rights in China, and discuss existing re-
search on the local level determinants of actual land rights
institutional arrangements in Chinese villages. The main ob-
jective is to emphasise and understand the striking discrep-
ancy between central regulations on rural land and the actual
functioning of local land institutions.
The first part of the paper will describe the key official reg-
ulations on rural land as well as the actual functioning of land
arrangements at the local level, while the second section will
review the empirical studies on these institutions, with a spe-
cial focus on the most recent period.Rural  land in  China:  Nationalregulations  and local  practic es
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was reversed, and a movement of increased individualisation
began. This section first briefly recalls the organisation of
rural China before 1978, and then delineates the evolution
of official laws and regulations on rural land during the re-
forms.
The dynamics  of  co llec t ivisation:  1949-1978
When the CCP seized power in 1949, to a great extent with
peasant support, one of its first policies was the Land Re-
form Law of June 1950, (4) which redistributed land from
landlords and rich peasants to poorer ones. By 1952, close
to a half of all agricultural land was redistributed, (5) with
roughly 60 percent of the farmers, 300 million people, being
net winners. (6) This law gave extended land rights to farm-
ers, including ownership, use, and transfer rights guaranteed
by land ownership certificates. This first reform then as-
serted private property over evenly distributed land.
However, during the First Five-Year Plan, starting in 1953,
rural people were first encouraged and then forced to join
collectivist structures. In 1955, the CCPCC published its
Decisions on Agricultural Cooperation, made into law by
the SCNPC in 1956 through the Charter of Agricultural
Production Cooperatives. These documents respected pri-
vate ownership of rural land, but encouraged peasants to or-
ganise production collectively. However, the same year, the
National People’s Congress (NPC) approved the Charter
of Advanced Agricultural Production Cooperatives, which
explicitly stated that private property must be abolished.
Events accelerated at the end of the 1950s. Disappointed
with the First Five-Year Plan, Mao Zedong militated for a
Great Leap Forward to a communist society, which was of-
ficially endorsed by the CCPCC in May 1958. As for agri-
culture, it led to a complete change in the scope of collectivi-
sation. (7) The new collective units, the People’s Communes,
gathered together, on average, as many as 5,500 house-
holds, (8) and private rights and privacy were considerably re-
duced. By the end of the 1950s, 90 percent of rural house-
holds belonged to these collectivist structures.
As early as 1961, the manifest failure of the Great Leap
Forward led to important adjustments embodied, in respect
of agriculture, in the Sixty Articles on Agriculture ap-
proved by the CCPCC on March 1961, which remained
the basis for rural and agricultural organisation until
1978. (9) Private plots and markets were authorised anew,
while the collective management of agricultural production
was decentralised at the level of production teams or
brigades of around 45-50 households. The scope of collec-
tivism was then reduced, while a marginal private economy
was tolerated. This equilibrium prevailed until 1978, when,
two years after Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping and his sup-
porters eventually rose to the higher reaches of the govern-
ment and promoted radically new economic policies for
rural China.
State  pol ici es and  local  exper iments :  The  founding  years  o f  the  Household Respons ibil ity  System (1978-1986)
At the very outset of the reforms, two main levels of decision
reshaped the organisation and functioning of rural areas: if
the state played a key role, the main innovations came from
grass-root villages. (10)
The CCPCC launched rural reforms in December 1978 by
enhancing the 1961 adjustment policies. The collective or-
ganisation of agriculture was maintained, but the parallel pri-
vate economy was expanded. The most detrimental aspects
of central planning were also reformed. State prices were
corrected in favour of agriculture, while the constraints of
local autarky were relaxed. Finally, the rural People’s Com-
munes were reformed before being eventually dismantled in
1984. 
The most important changes, however, come from local ex-
periments in Anhui province, (11) where some localities de-
cided to lease farmland to households. Despite the absence
88 N o  2 0 1 0 / 4
4. All legal documents mentioned are summarised in Appendix, with links to resources. 
5. Nicholas Lardy, “Economic Recovery and the 1st Five-Year Plan,” in Roderick MacFar-
quhar and John Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The Peo-
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Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 153.
6. Ping Li and Roy Prosterman, “From Collective to Household Tenure: China and Else-
where,” in Roy Prosterman et al. (eds.), One Billion Rising: Law, Land and the Alleviation
of Global Poverty, Leiden, Leiden University Press, 2009, p. 283.
7. See Nicholas Lardy, “The Chinese Economy Under Stress, 1958-1965,” in Roderick
MacFarquhar and John Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14, The
People’s Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 363-367.
8. Ibid., p. 365.
9. Ibid., pp. 388-391.
10. A synthetic review can be found in the first chapter of Louis Putterman, Continuity and
Change in China’s Rural Development: Collective and Reform Eras in Perspective, New
York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 9-59, while a more complete de-
scription is provided by Robert Ash, “The Evolution of Agricultural Policy,” The China
Quarterly, vol. 116, 1988, pp. 529–555.
11. They are described at length by Qinghe Huang, “Land Policy in Rural China in Retro-
spect, and New Problems,” in Land Tenure Center of University of Wisconsin-Madison
(ed.), Transition of China’s Rural Land System, Papers from the International Symposium
on Rural Land Issues in China, Land Tenure Center of University of Wisconsin-Madison,
1995, pp. 3-18, and in Chapter 6 of Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural
Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine, Stanford, Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1996, pp. 144-179.
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of approval from higher-level authorities, it is estimated that
90 percent of Anhui production teams contracted out farm-
land by 1980. Facing this fait accompli, CCPCC Document
No. 75 legalised the system in 1980, but only where it was
already practiced. This immediately led to a tremendous ex-
pansion of the system, which was finally endorsed by
CCPCC 1982 Document No. 1.
The functioning of this new system was clarified by a series
of Documents No. 1, from 1982 to 1986, and was finally
legally defined by the Land Management Law of 1986,
based on the new Constitution of 1982. After eight years of
experiments and legal evolution, the “Household Responsi-
bility System” (HRS) was then set up in 1986.
The Household  Respons ibil ity  System:1986-1998
The founding principle of land status in China lies in the so-
cialist nature of its state: as land is a mean of production, its
ownership is collective. In urban areas, land is owned by the
state. In rural areas, agricultural land is owned by rural col-
lectives, while “mineral resources, waters, forests, moun-
tains, grassland, unreclaimed land, beaches, and other natu-
ral resources are owned by the State.” (12)
The basis of the HRS was introduced in Article 9 of the
1986 Land Management Law: land can be allocated to in-
dividuals or units for use and management. Each responsible
individual or unit has to deliver a quota or to pay taxes, but
is free to dispose of the surplus. According to the 1984 Doc-
ument No. 1, the contract duration is 15 years, and rural in-
dividuals are granted land transfer rights. Farmers’ land
rights are then supposed to be secure and extended.
This general framework, however, is locally implemented
with considerable variance, as the central state has little
power to monitor local authorities, and as rural individuals
lack effective means to defend their rights. A series of gen-
eral characteristics can nevertheless be drawn.
First, as rural land is collectively owned, all rural citizens are
entitled to it. As a consequence, landlessness is virtually ab-
sent, (13) and land appears to serve as a safety net for rural
people. (14)
Second, despite state efforts, farmers’ rights seldom remain un-
challenged, and land transfers take place predominantly
through administrative but illegal ways rather than through mar-
ket processes, as stressed by investigations carried out in the
1990s, especially by James Kai-sing Kung. (15) As a conse-
quence, land remains allocated on a more or less egalitarian
way. However, village-land reallocation creates insecurity for
farmers, and can lead to allocative inefficiency, as will be dis-
cussed later.
The actual functioning of the HRS at the local level re-
mained, in the 1980s and 1990s, quite removed from state
laws and regulations. Peasants’ actual rights were less ex-
tended and secure than their legal and official rights. Be-
cause of this discrepancy, central authorities resumed intense
legal and regulatory activity in this domain at the end of the
1990s.
The second wave  o f  r e forms:  1998 to today
With the revision of the 1986 Land Management Law,
1998 marked a significant renewal of political interest in
rural land issues, which culminated with the 2007 Property
Law and with seven consecutive Documents No. 1, from
2004 to 2010, dedicated to this topic. The general objective
was to further extend and secure peasants’ rights over their
land.
Central authorities have been especially concerned with es-
tablishing secure rights in the long term for Chinese farmers.
The first move in that direction was constituted by the
CCPCC 1993 Document No. 11, which extended farmers’
land rights to 30 years. It was followed, in 1997, by Docu-
ment No. 16, which strictly limited village land reallocation
or taking. However, these regulations remained declarations
of principles, as they lacked actual implementation proce-
dures.
They were followed by a series of laws in the years 1998-
2007. In 1998, the 1986 Land Management Law was re-
vised, and then completed in 2002 by a Law on Land Con-
tracts in Rural Areas. Finally, the very important Property
Law, which includes dispositions of rural land rights, was
passed in 2007.
These laws reasserted the principles of the 1993 and 1997
documents, and progressively extended and strengthened
farmers’ rights. (16) As for land rights security, the revised
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12. 1982 Constitution, Articles 9 and 10.
13. Ping Li and Roy Prosterman, “From Collective to Household Tenure: China and Else-
where,” op. cit., p. 289.
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School of Economics Working Paper, 2001, available online at
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/rburgess/wp/land_and__welfare2.pdf.
15. James Kai-sing Kung, “Equal Entitlement versus Tenure Security under a Regime of Col-
lective Property Rights: Peasants’ Preference for Institutions in Post-reform Chinese
Agriculture,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 21, no. 1, 1995, pp. 82-111; James
Kai-sing Kung, “Common Property Rights and Land Reallocations in Rural China: Evi-
dence from a Village Survey,” World Development, vol. 28, no. 4, 2000, pp. 701-719.
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Land Management Law of 1998 and the 2002 Law on
Land Contracts in Rural Areas both reaffirmed the 30-year
duration of land contracts, while the 2007 Property Law im-
plicitly granted farmers perpetual rights, as it stated that
farmers should retain their rights when the 30 years are over.
Moreover, the Property Law for the first time defined farm-
ers’ rights as usufructuary, giving them stronger protection
than under their previous regime as contractual rights. These
provisions were completed by strict regulations on land read-
justment or seizure. Land reallocation was forbidden except
in the case of natural disaster, in which case it required ac-
ceptance by two-thirds of village representatives and town-
ship authorities. Land seizures by collective authorities in
order to convert rural land to non-agricultural use was permit-
ted, but must be for the “public interest,” (17) and farmers
must get “appropriate compensation.” (18) Finally, since the
2002 Law on Land Contracts in Rural Areas, land contracts
between local authorities and farmers must be made in writ-
ing, and if they are illegal or encroached upon, farmers have
the right to judicial recourse. This law also gives and speci-
fies land transfer rights for peasants. These new legal dispos-
als have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the central authori-
ties, especially in the seven consecutive Documents No. 1
from 2004 to 2010.
At the same time, two laws with important consequences for
the functioning of local institutional arrangements on land
have been passed. First, the 1998 revised Organic Law of
Village Committees settled the organisation of village-level
democracy, with village assemblies and elected village com-
mittees being put in charge of the management of rural land.
This transfer of responsibilities to elected representatives was
meant to reduce the arbitrary decision power of cadres and
local CCP members. (19) Second, the “Tax-for-fee” reform, (20)
experimented with first in Anhui Province at the end of the
1990s and then extended nationwide in 2001 (SCNPC
Document No. 12) and 2003 (SCNPC Document No. 12),
suppressed the various fees levied on peasants and turned
them into a single tax of limited scope and level. The idea
was to reduce the fiscal pressure on peasants and limit the in-
centives of local authorities to manipulate land. This first step
in agricultural fiscal reform was followed by a radical move at
the end of 2005, when the SCNPC decided to abolish agri-
cultural taxes. At the same time, since the beginning of the
2000s, the Chinese state has multiplied the subsidies to
which Chinese peasants are entitled. (21) Over the last decade,
Chinese farmers have not only experienced a rapid evolution
of the land institutional framework, they have also seen a rad-
ical change in the rural taxation system.
The last  o ffi cia l  l imi t:  Land-use  change
Today, in 2010, according to prevailing laws, the only right
farmers do not have is to change land use from agricultural
to non-agricultural, due to two main obstacles.
First, according to the Constitution, agricultural land is col-
lectively owned while non-agricultural land is state owned.
Change of use then implies a change of owners, and a rede-
finition of farmers’ contractual rights. This can happen, but
is still mainly done by collective authorities and is possible
only with great difficulty at the individual level. (22)
Second, since the 1990s, China has been committed to a
policy of soil and farmland protection to reduce the loss of
agricultural land to non-agricultural uses, or due to ero-
sion. (23)
In 1994, the Regulations on the Protection of Basic Farm-
land were promulgated by the SCNPC to radically limit
land use change and the decrease in agricultural soil. The
principle was to identify “basic farmland,” i.e. soil of above-
average quality, the use change for which must be approved
by provincial or national authorities. The scope of these reg-
ulations was extended to all farmland in 1998 by the revised
Land Management Law, which set a compulsory objective
of no net decrease in farmland. Finally, these repeated con-
cerns about the preservation of agricultural soil led the Min-
istry of Land and Resources, in the third National overall
planning for land use (2006-2010), published in 2008, to set
a bottom line of 1.8 billion mu of arable land in China. All
these regulations transferred the right to change land use
from individual peasants to higher levels of the political hier-
archy.
Moreover, to prevent soil erosion, an important policy of
land preservation was initiated in the 1990s. The Water and
Soil Conservation Law of 1991 first prohibited the exploita-
tion of land with a slope above 25 degrees. A Sloped Land
Conversion Program was then launched in 1999 to turn all
sloped cropland into forest or grassland in order to prevent
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21. For an up-to-date and synthetic account, see Wusheng Yu and Hans G. Jensen, “China’s
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nal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 61, no. 2, 2010, pp. 343–368.
22. Chengri Ding, “Policy and Praxis of Land Acquisition in China,” Land Use Policy, vol. 24,
no. 1, 2007, pp. 1–3.
23. Erik Lichtenberg and Chengri Ding, “Assessing Farmland Protection Policy in China,”
Land Use Policy, vol. 25, no. 1, 2008, pp. 59–68.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Land Rights in Rural China since 1978
soil erosion. (24) However, due to the decrease in arable land,
now close to its bottom line, this program was suspended by
the MLR in 2009. (25)
As a consequence, since the end of the 1990s, it has been
very hard, if not impossible, for an individual farmer to turn
agricultural land into non-agricultural productive use. This
right remains in the hands of collective and state authorities.
The goals of the central authorities have then been, since
1993 and especially during the last decade, extremely clear:
farmers’ rights must be extended and secured at the expense
of collective authorities’ discretionary powers, the only re-
maining limit to farmers’ rights being that of land use
change. 
The HRS today :  Actual  functioning
As for the actual functioning of the HRS, the latest avail-
able evidence (as of 2010) is provided by the 2008 survey
carried out by the Rural Development Institute (RDI). (26)
The primary conclusion is that the HRS is still operated in
a very informal way, with national laws and regulations
reaching rural villages only in small part. To mention two ex-
amples, in 2008, only one-third (32 percent) of farmers had
the official documents made compulsory by the 2002 law,
while 41.8 percent had no documentation at all. At the same
time, and unsurprisingly, farmers had a poor knowledge and
understanding of their rights. For example, in 2008, one-
third (35.9 percent) of surveyed farmers had not heard of
the 2002 law, while only slightly more than a quarter (28.7
percent) had heard of the 2007 Property Law.
However, the serie of central laws and Documents has still
had an impact. The pace of land reallocations has decreased,
while land markets seem to have developed. Indeed, the
same survey indicates that roughly 15 percent of farmers
transferred out their land in 2008, (27) whereas another inves-
tigation on rural land markets carried out in 2002 showed
that only 3.2 percent of farm households did so in 2001, and
virtually none in 1996. (28) As for administrative reallocations
of land, a 2005 survey of the NBS and the World Bank
specifically dedicated to this issue shows that the share of vil-
lages experiencing collective land reallocations has signifi-
cantly decreased after the implementation of the 2002 Law
on Land Contracts in Rural Areas, from 13.18 percent to
8.32 percent. (29) It appears, then, that in the last decade, land
allocation at the local level has increasingly been taking place
through market rather than administrative transfers.
This evolution remains far from complete, however. The
slight increase in land transfers does not necessarily indicate
a development of market processes, as few transfers involve
compensation or payment. (30) Another significant develop-
ment, much more detrimental to farmers, is that the devel-
opment of the non-agricultural sector and of urbanisation,
combined with the afore-mentioned regulations on farmland
protection and soil preservation, has considerably increased
the pressure on land as well as its value for non-agricultural
uses. As land use change and its expected benefits can only
be reaped by authorities that have the capacity to change
land use, seizure of land has increased considerably, (31) often
with inadequate compensation for farmers. Just as land real-
location was arguably the main issue of the first two decades
of the HRS, unilateral land seizure has emerged as the main
problem today.The  Household  Respons ib il i tySystem:  Successes ,  shortcom-ings,  and f lexibi l ity
The rural reforms initiated around 1980 have been ex-
tremely successful. Whereas the average rural real income
per capita was at the same level in 1978 as in 1956, (32) it in-
creased by 15 percent a year over the next six years. (33) This
success has been largely attributed to the new institutional
framework prevailing after the introduction of the HRS.
The reasons invoked will be briefly analysed in the first part
of this section, as literature on this issue is extensive and lit-
erature reviews already numerous. However, despite a con-
tinuous increase in rural revenues, rural areas have benefited
less from Chinese economic growth than urban ones since
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1985, and inequalities between urban and rural citizens have
been steadily increasing. Shortcomings in the HRS system
have also been invoked to account for this gap, and they will
be analysed in the second part. Finally, central government
policies aimed at improving the perceived dysfunction of
land rights institutions have faced severe difficulties in grass-
roots villages, as local interests have a strong role in deter-
mining local arrangements, an aspect that will be examined
in the third and last part of this section.
The HRS vs coll ect i visation:  The  facto rs  ofsuccess ,  and remaining short comings
The tremendous success of the HRS in its first years was the
subject of a wide range of literature in the second half of the
1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. The main point of
debate was to determine the respective importance of the
consequences of changes in national policies, such as increas-
ing prices for agricultural products and increasing supply of in-
puts, of changes in technology, and of institutional evolution.
Indeed, one of the main criticisms raised against the socialist
organisation of production, especially in agriculture, was the
lack of incentives due to the absence of private appropriation
of gains due to increased effort. Rural China in the reform
era is then a perfect case study to verify the superiority and
efficiency of markets. As a consequence, a huge empirical lit-
erature has developed on this topic in the case of China.
Theoretically, three main advantages can be expected from
the introduction of the HRS and of market processes. First,
they are likely to increase the effort provided by farmers, as
they become the full “residual claimants” over their produc-
tion. The second expected gain is an allocative one. If indi-
viduals have better information on the efficiency of soil uses
and agricultural techniques, they can make better choices
about crops and technologies than central planners. Finally,
the spread of market processes and trade should allow farm-
ers to receive the benefits of comparative advantages, and to
allocate soils to their most productive uses.
As for the case of rural China, the empirical studies based
on these theoretical arguments have recently been sum-
marised and discussed by Yu Xiaohua and Zhao Guo-
qing. (34) Since the beginning of the 1980s, an important
body of literature has discussed the respective effects of
changes in institutions, prices, inputs, and technology in the
unprecedented success of Chinese agricultural reforms dur-
ing the period 1978-1985. However, it remains undeniable
that the diffusion of the HRS, that is to say the institutional
dimension of reform, has had an extremely important effect.
Whatever the data or methodology used, the HRS is one of
the two most important factors behind China’s agricultural
performance at the beginning of the 1980s, and it is widely
acknowledged that the main direct consequences of the in-
troduction of HRS were to give farmers residual claim over
their production and increase the degree of productive
choices, which increased individual effort on the one hand,
and improved efficiency on the other.
The significant slow-down in the increase of rural incomes
since 1985 has changed the main focus of researchers from
the success of the HRS to its shortcomings. As mentioned
above, two major rights remain, according to or despite cen-
tral laws, in the hands of collective authorities. First, accord-
ing to national laws and regulations, individual farmers do
not have the right to change land use, which is a prerogative
of political authorities. Second, despite repeated efforts by
the central state since the mid-1980s to limit and then ban
administrative transfers of land, all surveys carried out up to
the late 2000s show that local collective authorities have
generally retained their (illegal) power to transfer land use
rights among farmers. As a result, Chinese farmers do not
enjoy the right to change the use of their land, and they have
only limited and tentative rights to transfer their plots. These
two constraints have detrimental consequences for Chinese
farmers and overall development along two dimensions.
First, they directly affect agricultural performance. Second,
they have a direct impact on structural change by preventing
land and labour from moving out of agriculture. It should
also be noted that these limits on farmers’ individual rights
affect their behaviour through two channels: first, they di-
rectly limit what they can do with their land, and second, the
fact that land transfers and land use changes can be decided
unilaterally by collective authorities creates insecurity for
farmers, as they could see their land rights unexpectedly
jeopardised by village leaders. The empirical literature on
these issues is reviewed below.
Consequences  on  ag ricultural  development:  Land al location
The first impact of imperfect land rights institutions is, of
course, directly on agricultural development. This section re-
views the empirical evidence in the Chinese case.
The first of the remaining limits on farmers’ land use rights
is that on land transfers. The transfer of household land-use
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rights, through rental or sale, has been officially allowed by the
central government since the mid-1980s. However, for reasons
that will be developed later, rural land is still generally allocated
through administrative or collective processes, and actual indi-
vidual land transfers and land markets have remained quite lim-
ited. The main expected gain of such transfers is the transfer of
land from less productive to more productive households. 
Lohmar, Zhang, and Somwaru (35) use a 1998 survey on 825
peasant households distributed in 30 villages to verify whether
households who take on more land have a systematically higher
productivity than ones that do not. They compute an agricul-
tural production function for every single land plot, including a
dummy indicating whether the farming household rents addi-
tional land. This dummy has a positive coefficient showing that
households renting additional land have a higher marginal pro-
ductivity than those that do not. This indicates that rental mar-
kets do actually allow land to be transferred to more productive
households.
Benjamin and Brandt (36) take a different approach. Using data
gathered in 30 villages of Hebei and Liaoning provinces, they
find an inverse relationship between a household’s farm size
and labour productivity, which means that too much labour is
used on small farms compared to larger ones, (37) with an esti-
mated 30 days of work per year “wasted” on medium and
small farms. The existence of off-farm work opportunities and
administrative reallocations alleviate, but do not cancel out, this
allocative inefficiency.
Deininger and Jin (38) use a four-year panel dataset on agricul-
tural households in three of the poorest provinces (Guizhou,
Hunan, Yunnan) in 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2001. They first
estimate an “agricultural production ability” at the household
level, and then show that administrative processes of land allo-
cation lead to land transfers from households with more land
and lower productivity to those with less land and higher pro-
ductivity, but that market exchanges are more efficient. Imme-
diately removing constraints on land rentals at current prices
could lead to a 3.5 percent gain in production. 
Continuing in that direction, Jin and Deininger (39) use a four-
year panel dataset (2001-2004) of 8,000 households in about
800 villages to further investigate the effects of land rentals.
They confirm that individual transfers of land lead to an effi-
ciency-enhancing equalisation of production factors across
households.
These results have been confirmed by a survey carried out in
2000 and 2002 by Feng, Heerink, Ruben, and Qu (40) on 52
farm households in northern Jiangxi Province, which shows
that households renting additional land actually achieve higher
productivity on their plots.
A series of empirical studies has thus shown that the devel-
opment of land rental markets made possible by individual
land transfer rights can potentially have important effects on
agricultural efficiency. Investment is another channel
through which the development of individual land transfer
rights at the expense of administrative reallocation could
have a positive impact on agricultural development.
Consequences  on  agr icultura l  development:  Investment
As Chinese farmers’ land transfer rights are limited, land al-
location remains driven mainly by collective authorities. This
naturally creates uncertainty about the actual duration of
land-use rights, and can have the direct consequence of re-
ducing investment.
The most detailed study on this issue is provided by Jacoby,
Li, and Rozelle, (41) who investigate how a household time
horizon over specific plots affects the use of fertilizer. Using
the same survey as the afore-mentioned study by Benjamin
and Brandt, (42) they use the fact that the degree of land
rights security can vary according to village-level policies and
land plot and household characteristics to compute a “haz-
ard function” that indicates how long a household can expect
to keep a given plot. As expected, the use of organic fertil-
izer, which has lasting effects on soil quality, is reduced
when there is a higher risk of losing a specific plot, whereas
this shortened time horizon has no impact on chemical fer-
tilizers, the benefits of which do not last beyond a season.
However, while significant, the efficiency cost of land rights
insecurity is not very important: the authors estimate that se-
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35. Bryan Lohmar et al., “Land Rental Market Development And Agricultural Production In
China,” paper presented during the 2001 Annual meeting of the American Agricultural
Economics Association, 5-8 August, Chicago.
36. Dwayne Benjamin and Loren Brandt, “Property Rights, Labour Markets, and Efficiency in
a Transition Economy: The Case of Rural China,” The Canadian Journal of Economics /
Revue canadienne d’Économie, vol. 35, no. 4, 2002, pp. 689-716.
37. Large farms are defined as those in the 90th percentile, and thus cover an area exceed-
ing 33 mu.
38. Klaus Deininger and Songqing Jin, “The Potential of Land Rental Markets in the Process
of Economic Development: Evidence from China,” op. cit.
39. Songqing Jin and Klaus Deininger, “Land Rental Markets in the Process of Rural Struc-
tural Transformation: Productivity and Equity Impacts from China,” Journal of Compara-
tive Economics, vol. 37, no. 4, 2009, pp. 629-646. 
40. Shuyi Feng et al., “Land rental market, off-farm employment and agricultural production
in Southeast China: A plot-level case study,” China Economic Review, vol. 21, no. 4, De-
cember 2010, pp. 598-606.
41. Hanan Jacoby et al., “Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in
Rural China,” American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 5, 2002, pp. 1420-1447.
42. Dwayne Benjamin and Loren Brandt, “Property Rights, Labour Markets, and Efficiency in
a Transition Economy: The Case of Rural China,” op. cit.
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curing land tenure for 15 or 30 years would increase land
value by less than 1 percent.
As for Deininger and Jin, (43) they use their survey on 1,001
households in 2001 (44) to study the consequences of land
rights security on investment. They make use of the fact that
Guizhou Province in 1994 enacted an experimental policy
labelled the “two-nos” policy, for “no land increase for new
population, no land decrease for reduced population.” (45)
They then compare the investment behaviours of house-
holds in Guizhou with those of farmers in the neighbouring
provinces of Yunnan and Hunan, which did not implement
this policy. They also compare investment behaviours in vil-
lages that did and did not implement the “two-nos,” regard-
less of province-level policies. They find that, as expected, a
higher level of land rights security leads to higher invest-
ment, and the effect is especially strong when land can be
transferred — that is to say, when land is a liquid asset.
These two studies confirm that land rights insecurity has a
constraining impact on agricultural investment. Combined
with the relative allocative inefficiency of collective realloca-
tions, this can partly explain why the rate of increase in agri-
cultural productivity has been slowing down.
Consequences  on  s tructura l  change:Labour
Structural change represents the transfer of factors of pro-
duction, especially labour, from traditional activities to mod-
ern sectors. It is a critical determinant of economic develop-
ment. Rural land rights have consequences on the sectoral
allocation of two production factors: labour and, of course,
land.
The remaining limitations and constraints on individual
transfer rights have consequences on labour allocation, di-
rectly, on the one hand, because individuals cannot freely
and easily transfer out their land if they want to leave agri-
culture, and indirectly, on the other hand, because of the in-
security created by administrative reallocations.
The first argument is formalised by Yang. (46) The idea is that
since land cannot be leased or sold, leaving agriculture
means the uncompensated loss of the stream of income as-
sociated with farming. The absence of land transfer rights
then adds cost when an individual chooses to try for an off-
farm job, and directly constrains labour allocation and struc-
tural change.
This hypothesis is empirically checked by Rozelle, Guo,
Shen, Hughart, and Giles. (47) Their analysis of a survey of
200 villages in 1995 shows that the existence of land rental
markets in a village is positively correlated with migration be-
haviours, a result suggesting that migration is easier when
there is a possibility of transferring out land.
This first direct effect of the absence of land transfer rights
on labour allocation is reinforced by the threat of land real-
location by collective authorities. Indeed, workers allocating
more of their time to off-farm activities are likely to see their
land rights jeopardised and transferred to those who remain
more involved in agriculture. 
Lohmar (48) uses a survey carried out in 1995 among 787
households in 31 villages of Hebei and Liaoning
provinces (49) to estimate the impact of land rights insecurity
on households’ off-farm labour participation. He uses the
proportion of households affected by past village-wide reallo-
cations as indicating land rights insecurity, and finds an im-
pact on the probability of being locally self-employed, while
correlations with local employed work or out-migration, as
well as with the duration of off-farm occupation, are all in-
significant. The effect on labour allocation thus seems to be
small.
As for Mullan, Grosjean, and Kontoleon, (50) they use data
on 571 households in Ningxia and Guizhou provinces and
find that a higher level of perceived insecurity (self-reported
probability of having to face a land reallocation) has a nega-
tive impact on migration decisions, while the possibility of
leasing land has no significant effect.
Finally, the work of de  la Rupelle, Deng, Li, and
Vendryes (51) uses the Chinese Household Income Project
(CHIP) dataset on rural areas, covering 37,969 people in
2002. They measure the impact of a household’s exposure
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to land rights insecurity on the work time allocated to migra-
tion. Land rights insecurity is indicated by the interaction be-
tween the existence of collectively retained “flexible land” in
a village, measuring land rights insecurity at the village level,
and the proportion of relatively secure “grain ration land” in
households’ land holdings, giving the exposure of household
land to overall insecurity. They find a negative impact on mi-
gration, but this effect, while significant, remains small.
Empirical evidence on the constraining impact of land rights
insecurity and of the absence of land transfer rights remain
scant, and when a constraining effect is found, it remains
minimal.
Consequences  on  structural  change:  Land
As mentioned earlier, land use change remains very difficult
and strictly framed in China due to a series of national regu-
lations for the protection of farmland and the environment.
However, this has not prevented agricultural land from being
converted into urban or industrial use. The development of
satellite imagery has allowed detailed study of this evolu-
tion (52) and has revealed a very significant expansion of urban
or industrial use of land at the expense of agriculture. Na-
tional laws and regulations do not seem to have significantly
affected land use change, except for the “grain-for-green” pol-
icy, which has led to an increase in grassland and forest cov-
erage. Agricultural land is then jeopardised from both sides:
by environmental as well as urban development concerns.
Using satellite imagery data, Deng, Huang, Rozelle, and
Uchida (53) have shown that farmers and rural authorities were
still able, at least up to 2000, to compensate for land loss due
to urban expansion and environmental protection. Even if the
newly exploited soils are of inferior quality, the increase in
quantity has allowed maintenance of overall land endow-
ments. However, most recent studies, using data from the
land use change monitoring system of the MLR and from
agricultural censuses, find a slight decline in agricultural soil
before 2000 and a significant acceleration in this decline af-
terwards, mainly due to ecological programs. (54) Under the
continuing pressure of structural change on the one hand and
ecological concerns on the other, it is quite likely that this
trend will continue in the foreseeable future, as shown by the
simulations using the Chinagro welfare model. (55)
Soil preservation policies did not, then, prevent land from
being transferred from agricultural to non-agricultural uses,
but in themselves exacerbated the scarcity of agricultural
soil, an evolution that is expected to continue in the coming
years. 
While the introduction of the HRS was extremely success-
ful during the first half of the 1980s, limitations on farmers’
rights acted as a constraint on agricultural development and
structural change. This raises the question of the reasons be-
hind the fact that land rights arrangements at the local level
can diverge significantly from the central authorities’ will. In
fact, rural land rights arrangements influenced by national
laws are also the result of the interests of local leaders and
villagers at the grassroots level. 
Land r ights  insti tutions  f lexib il i ty:  The  interests  o f  lo ca l  author it i es
Local flexibility in arrangements on rural land is acknowl-
edged by the Organic Law of the Village Committees,
which gives village leaders responsibility for land manage-
ment. Their interests therefore play a crucial role in the def-
inition of land use rights. Rozelle (56) identifies three of them:
private interests, administrative duties, and economic effi-
ciency. 
The study of Rozelle and Li (57) uses a sample of 184 villages
surveyed in 1996 to specifically investigate how village lead-
ers use land rights to achieve these various objectives. Their
leading idea is that the more benefits, personal or collective,
a village leader can expect from land manipulation, the more
incentive he has to reallocate land and thus to maintain land
rights insecurity, measured by the number of past land real-
locations. As expected, they find that the higher the bene-
fits associated with the control of the village economy, the
higher the level of insecurity. 
Brandt, Rozelle, and Turner (58) follow the same kind of
methodology with a survey carried out in 1995 and 1996 in
215 villages. They show that land reallocations can be sub-
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stitutes for missing markets, and can be used by village lead-
ers to maintain equity across households, but that village
leaders also respond to political demands such as quota ful-
filment as well as to rent-seeking activities.
Empirical studies therefore tend to show that land rights in-
stitutions are at least partly shaped locally, by village leaders
pursuing more or less selfish benefits. However, the three
aforementioned studies examined the situation of Chinese
villages before 1998, that is, before the second wave of leg-
islative and regulatory activity on land rights issues. The role
of village leaders today in shaping land rights therefore re-
mains unclear.
Land r ights  institutions  f l exibil ity:  The  interests  of  farmers
Due to the expected benefits of secure and extended rights,
it seems obvious that farmers would like to have land rights
extended and secured as much as possible. However, all sur-
veys on farmers’ preferences conclude that there is no gen-
eral or unequivocal preference for more private, extended, or
secure land rights. 
The Rural Development Institute has been conducting sur-
veys on land rights issues and farmers’ preferences since
2000. (59) For example, in 2004, (60) a huge majority of farm-
ers (between 80 percent and 90 percent) were in favour of
acquiring the right to lease land. However, only 48 percent
(vs. 39 percent) were in favour of acquiring the right to
transfer their entire 30-year land use rights, while a minority
(29.5 percent vs 49.5 percent) favoured the possibility of
mortgaging land. The following surveys show a continuous
increase in support for extended and secure rights, but as of
2008, on the issue of administratively-led land readjust-
ments, 45 percent of farmers declared that they opposed the
practice of land readjustments, against 38.3 percent in
2001. (61) The support for secure land rights is therefore in-
creasing but not overwhelming. 
The works of James Kung have been dedicated to the same
issues. In 1993, (62) he carried out a first survey on 400 peas-
ant households in Hunan and Sichuan provinces, especially
focused on existing and desired institutional arrangements on
land, and found a great diversity in the extent and security
of rights granted to households, and an even greater varia-
tion in farmers’ preferences. For example, to the general
question “Where do you think ownership should reside?”,
there was only one county where there was significant sup-
port (16 percent of respondents) for individual ownership.
In all other places, land ownership was seen as having to re-
main in the hand of collective or state authorities. The au-
thor concluded that in a land-scarce, labour-abundant econ-
omy, farmers preferred to be sure that periodic collective
readjustments of land would provide them with land holdings
in accordance with their changing family needs.
Kung and Liu (63) replicated this investigation in 1994 with
roughly the same results, with a good majority of farmers
(62 percent) opposing the state policy of stabilising land
plots for 30 years. They showed that support for collective
land readjustment was strongest in places where the econ-
omy remained mostly agricultural, and was higher among the
poorest households. Their interpretation was that farm
households in this context saw land as an insurance device
that must evolve according to family changes, and that this
objective was better attained through administrative rather
than market allocation processes. The authors also stressed
the egalitarian spirit of post-Maoist rural society.
Using an 80-village survey of eight counties in four provinces
carried out in 1994, Kung (64) showed that land reallocations
were more frequent and larger where land was more valuable,
that is to say, where land was relatively scarce and where
there were fewer off-farm opportunities. Land readjustments
were then predominantly based on demographic evolution
and on attempts to maintain egalitarian distribution.
In 2002, Kung (65) enquired more precisely into the determi-
nants of conflicting interests between households. He used
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a 300-household survey of four villages in Guizhou Province
that had implemented an experimental policy of completely
halting land readjustments. His first finding was that while
support for this policy was majoritary ex ante, it significantly
decreased ex post. His investigation into farmers’ prefer-
ences and their link with household characteristics clearly
supported the view that halting land readjustments has im-
portant distributive affects, and that only potential winners
support this practice. To give an example, households with
more dependent members favour land reallocations, as they
are potential gainers.
Finally, using data from a survey carried out by the Ministry
of Agriculture in 1998 covering 824 farmers households in
six provinces, Kung (66) showed that off-farm workers tended
to rent out land, as might be expected, and that the increase
in off-farm opportunities therefore acted as a push factor on
the development of land markets. This further tends to indi-
cate that overall economic development, especially the in-
crease in off-farm activities, has a direct impact on farmers’
use of their land, and therefore on their preferences regard-
ing land institutions.
Studies by the Rural Development Institute and James Kai-
sing Kung therefore tend to show, contrary to expectation,
that there is a significant diversity in farmers’ preferences re-
garding land rights institutional arrangements, and that peas-
ant households, especially in a context of high reliance on
agricultural production, do not have clear-cut preferences for
more extended, more secure, or more private land rights.
Among the various explanations proposed, the fact that Chi-
nese rural citizens have lost the limited social safety net and
public services they enjoyed during the collectivist era (67) is
likely to play an important role in increasing the attractive-
ness of collective and more-or-less egalitarian processes of
land allocation. (68)Conclus ion
The effects of the reforms introduced in rural China since
1978 have led to one of the greatest victories against poverty
the world has ever experienced. In a handful of years, from
1978 to 1985, China’s rural incomes rose as never before.
Most of this success is attributed to the introduction and
spread of the Household Responsibility System (HRS),
which still constitutes the institutional framework for rural
land today.
The founding of the HRS and its variation across time and
location provides one of the best case studies on the conse-
quences and determinants of institutional arrangements over
land. The incentive effect of granting Chinese farmers free-
dom over production choices and residual claims over their
land production has proved extremely strong. However, the
remaining limits on land rights, and especially the fact that
land transfers are mainly carried out through administrative
procedures rather than market processes, still act as a con-
straint on agricultural development and structural change, de-
spite the repeated effort of the central state to extend and se-
cure farmers’ rights and to limit local authorities’ involvement
in land management.
Probably the most interesting characteristic of the HRS,
however, is its great flexibility, which reveals how institutions
respond to the contradictory interests of political leaders and
peasant households. In each Chinese village, the prevailing
institutional arrangement over land is the result of a complex
interaction between central state regulations, the behaviour
of local leaders, and the preferences of grassroots residents.
The optimality of land rights arrangements, as well as the ful-
filment of the desires of China’s rural citizens, cannot be as-
sessed globally, but constitute a local issue. •
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Year Index
1950 Land Reform Law
http://www.law110.com/law/country/1059.htm
1955 CCPCC Decisions on Agricultural Production
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-12/28/content_2388255.htm 
R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1966, pp. 106-116 (in English)
1956 Charter of Agricultural Production Cooperatives
http://law.148365.com/2534.html
1956 Charter of Advanced Agricultural Production Cooperatives
http://law.148365.com/2525.html
1961 Sixty Articles on Agriculture
http://www.weiweikl.com/sxzb18.htm
1962 Sixty Articles on Agriculture (revised version)
http://www.law110.com/law/other/19156.htm
1978 Communiqués of the Third Plenary Session of the CCP Eleventh Central Committee 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/1975390.htm 
de Bary(1999) et al., Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd ed., vol. 2, New York Chichester, Columbia University Press, pp. 485-
491 (in English)
1980 CCPCC Document No. 75
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/04/content_2547020.htm
1982 PRC Constitution
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-03/15/content_1367387.htm
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (in English)
1982 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://law.lawtime.cn/d535574540668.html/pos=0
1983 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/725,248/248.html
1984 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/726,248/248.html
1985 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/727,248/248.html
1986 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/728,248/248.html
1986 Land Management Law
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show.php?file_id=5349
1991 Water and Soil Conservation Law
http://www.chinawater.net.cn/law/W01.htm
http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2007-08/20/content_1034358.htm (in English)
1993 CCPCC Document No. 11
http://law.lawtime.cn/d491423496517.html/pos=0
1994 Regulations on the Protection of Basic Farmland
http://www.yangshuo.gov.cn/lawweb/wjk/flfg/013.htm
1997 CCPCC Document No. 16
http://www.law-lib.com/lawhtm/1997/66092.htm
1998 Revision of the 1986 Land Management Law
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=419
http://www.china.org.cn/english/environment/34345.htm (in English)
1998 Revision of the 1988 Organic Law of Village Committees
http://www.jincao.com/fa/01/law01.12.htmhttp://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm (in English)
Appendix. Chronological index of laws and regulations mentioned in the text, with sources
Appendix. (in Chinese unless stated otherwise)
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1998 Revision of the 1994 Regulations on the Protection of Basic Farmland
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-08/29/content_1053423.htm
http://gtzyzcfl.com.cn/english/news.asp?id=7697 (in English)
2001 SCNPC Document No. 5
http://news.eastday.com/eastday/zfgb/gwy/userobject1ai14906.html
2002 Law on Land Contracts in Rural Areas
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-08/30/content_543847.htm
http://www.gov.cn/english/laws/2005-10/09/content_75300.htm (in English)
2002 Regulations on the Grain-for-Green Program
http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2002-12/25/content_669840.htm
2003 SCNPC Document No. 12
http://www.mos.gov.cn/gjb/gjb_display.jsp?mid=20061228023390
2004 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/729,248/248.html
2005 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/730,248/248.html
2005 SCNPC Decision Concerning the Abolition of the Regulations on Agricultural Taxation
http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-12/30/content_142025.htm
2006 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/731,248/248.html
2007 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/732,248/248.html
2007 Property Law
http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=193400
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centre/laws-and-regulations/general/property-rights-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of-
china.html (in English)
2008 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/733,248/248.html
2008 Ministry of Land and Resources National Overall Planning for Land Use (2006-2020)
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/xwdt/jrxw/200810/t20081024_111040.htm
2009 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://www.yihaowenjian.com/index.php/newshow/jiangchuanmei/1/cn/734,248/248.html
2010 CCPCC Document No. 1
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/31/content_12907829.htm
